

29 September 2026

Subject: Urgent call to deploy effective, local and transparent mechanisms to protect Israel's General Elections for the 26th Knesset

Social media, messaging apps, search engines and AI services shape information exchange and public opinion in Israel's digital public sphere.¹ Alongside their benefits for Information accessibility, community building and participation in public discourse, their influence requires safeguards against misuse, especially during elections, for securing free and informed voter decision-making and protecting the information environment from interference and undue influence.²

With elections to the 26th Knesset approximately one month away (October 27th, 2026), **we call on major digital platforms and generative AI services to activate, adapt and expand in Israel the election safeguards they have deployed in many other countries**, drawing on Israeli and international expertise on systemic risks. Risks include concealed advertisers and funders; covert or coordinated campaigns; false or misleading information about voting or candidates; impersonation; and deceptive AI-generated content. Such activity may mislead voters, deepen divisions, disrupt elections and undermine trust in the democratic process, its institutions and results.³

Effective preparedness requires the platforms to make public declarations and appropriate resources and implementation whose results can be assessed. To our knowledge, some services have deployed election safeguards in Israel, but preparedness varies considerably despite most services' dedicated preparations in dozens of other countries during 2024-2026 alone.

We call for immediate, transparent implementation across five areas, adapting safeguards already used widely elsewhere to each service's role, characteristics and systemic risks:

¹ According to the Israel Internet Association's in-depth surveys, as of 2026 **more than 90% of those eligible to vote in the upcoming 2026 elections consume content on YouTube and Facebook, 82% on Instagram**, and approximately **60% on TikTok**. Nearly **100% of Israelis consume content and exchange messages on WhatsApp, approximately 75% on Facebook Messenger, and approximately 70% on Telegram**. The introduction of AI technologies has also significantly affected patterns of content and information consumption in Israel: today, **88% of adults in Israel use ChatGPT and approximately 73% use Gemini**, while a quarter of the Israeli public report that they are giving favorable consideration to using AI services to make a decision ahead of the elections. Up-to-date data and open analysis tools are available in the data.isoc.org.il repository.

² As the President of the State of Israel recently urged in his special statement of 21 July 2026: *"Elections are a test of Israeli democracy, and they are also a test of the unity and cohesion of Israeli society... In the age of social media, the dangers are great. We must all be wise, careful and responsible in the content we consume, and all the more so in the content we disseminate."*

³ Israel State Comptroller, **The National Response to Foreign Influence in the Digital Sphere**, Special Audit Report (July 2026; Israel Internet Association, **Addressing Foreign Influence and AI-Based Influence Campaigns During Elections: Background Materials and Data from the Israel Internet Association for the Knesset Science and Technology Committee** (January 2026).

A. Dedicated local election operations and coordination

We call for dedicated local election operations in Israel in the coming weeks, using the enhanced arrangements most services have deployed for national elections elsewhere. Centers coordinate teams, monitor and detect risks in real time, and support decisions and enforcement throughout the election period, enabling rapid and effective responses.⁴

Each major platform or service must operate a unit with local and linguistic expertise. We request its operating period, responsibilities, language coverage and procedures for referring incidents for review and decision.

B. Prominent access to reliable election information and authoritative sources

Platforms must deploy locally adapted measures used in national or federal elections elsewhere to counter disinformation and undue influence and provide corrective information. This must include voter information centers within Israeli service interfaces during elections, such as prominent panels and labels linking to the Central Elections Committee.

Search engines, LLMs (generative AI, chatbots) should make authoritative information prominent and accessible. They must provide accurate answers or referrals to official Central Elections Committee information on Israel's election date, electoral lists and candidates, eligibility, and where and how to vote, in both Hebrew and Arabic. They must also assess risks of incorrect, outdated or fabricated information.

In coordination with the Central Elections Committee, information must reflect Israel's electoral process and languages and remain current and accessible in searches and when users encounter election content. We request details of services, interfaces, languages, referral routes, official sources and updating responsibilities; systematic answer testing conducted in Hebrew, Arabic, Russian and Amharic; and procedures for correcting errors.

C. Advertiser verification, political advertising transparency, and synthetic content disclosure and labelling

Services allowing paid or promoted political ads must apply advertiser verification, funder identification and AI-use disclosure to ads targeting Israeli audiences, as they do elsewhere. Make ads and their details available through existing transparency tools.⁵ Specify coverage in Israel and available information on ad content, funder identity, display period, spending, exposure and target audience characteristics; retention periods, update frequency, search and data access; and restrictions on political ad targeting.⁶

⁴ Illustrative examples: In June 2025, the European Commission and the Moldovan authorities held an exercise to test responses to digital threats to elections, with the participation of government representatives, fact-checkers, cyber teams, and representatives of Meta, Google and TikTok. The exercise tested coordinated responses to scenarios involving disinformation, cyberattacks, platform manipulation and content forgery using artificial intelligence.

⁵ For example, the Meta Ad Library and Google's political advertising repository.

⁶ For example, Meta has announced that information on ads about elections and politics is retained in its Ad Library for seven years. Similarly, ahead of Australia's 2025 elections, Google reported a public ads library updated daily with a lag of approximately three to four days, as well as restrictions limiting election ad targeting to geographic location, age, gender and content context.

Where paid political ads are prohibited, explain how violations are detected and the ban enforced when payment or benefits occur outside the service's advertising system, including sponsored content by independent creators and influencers, payments to channel administrators and external commercial arrangements promoting political messages.⁷

Provide dedicated detection and labeling of synthetic content available to users in Israel during elections. Share with the professional community the protocols or standards used (such as C2PA Content Credentials or SynthID) and their reliability and limitations.⁸ Labeling does not replace enforcement against impersonation, deception or coordinated inauthentic activity.

D. Expanded trusted flagger partnerships and improved reporting and response times

Expand reporting partnerships, including Trusted Flagger and Reporting Partner programs, to relevant Israeli professional bodies and ensure availability throughout the election period. Provide priority channels for the Central Elections Committee and those bodies, designated contacts and escalation procedures for urgent incidents, enable report tracking and explanations of outcomes.

Specify eligibility, language coverage, operating hours, prioritization, and target times for acknowledgment, initial review, decision or escalation. Publish aggregate reporting volumes, actual handling times and the proportion resulting in action, broken down by service, report type and language.

E. Data access and research tools for academia and civil society

Guarantee Israeli researchers and research facilities working in the public interest and for election integrity access to appropriate research resources and data interfaces, including wider access to existing tools according to service type, data type and eligibility. Data should reveal levels of exposure to content and the effects of removal, reduced distribution, labeling and referrals to official information, beyond enforcement counts, while preserving messaging encryption and user privacy.

Where no dedicated research tool exists, publish at least aggregate data for Israel to inform professional assessment, insights and decisions.

* * *

⁷ For documentation of platforms' enforcement gaps regarding undisclosed political advertising, usually carried out through influencers, in the recent elections in Romania, Germany and Poland, see DSA Observatory, [How Has the DSA Performed in Protecting Election Integrity?](#) (2026).

⁸ For example, Google has adopted the C2PA standard for preserving content provenance information, uses SynthID to embed watermarks in content generated with the company's tools, and provides information on the origin of images through "About this image." Similarly, Meta uses visible and invisible markers and metadata for photorealistic images generated with Meta AI. See also AI Forensics, [Artificial Elections 2.0: Generative AI in the 2026 French Elections](#) (2026) (most AI-generated content published on official party accounts carried no visible label, even in cases where technical watermarks such as SynthID were detected in the files).

We urgently call for implement these measures without delay and publish full details of their operation in Israel, reflecting each service's characteristics, available technologies and risks. Adapt them to Israel's electoral process, social and political context, and Hebrew, Arabic, Russian and Amharic. These must include timelines, implementation stages and metrics enabling public and professional scrutiny of implementation and effectiveness. As a first step, respond to this letter and the company-specific annex mapping existing measures and gaps across your services.

The Israel Internet Association offers professional expertise and local knowledge to help establish a coordination framework among platforms, the Central Elections Committee and Israeli civil society: identifying risks, sharing professional information and providing feedback on safeguards in Israel.

We expect your response and concrete, transparent preparations to protect voters and the integrity of Israel's democratic process.

Sincerely,

Dr. Sharon Bar-Ziv

President

Adv. Yoram Hacohen

CEO

**Israel Internet Association (ISOC-IL)
Registered Association**

Cc:

Justice Noam Sohlberg, Deputy President of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Central Elections Committee

Adv. Dean Livne, Acting Director-General of the Central Elections Committee

Board of Directors, Israel Internet Association (Registered Association)