

Mapping Election-Protection Mechanisms and Requested Measures for Digital Services in Israel:
X / Grok

Documented measures specific or directly relevant to Israel	Election policies and mechanisms documented globally or outside Israel	Information and additional measures requested for Israel
Political advertising: Israel is expressly covered. Political Content/Campaigning ads require certification by X; local-law compliance; for 90 days pre-election through election day, ads will disclose the publisher and contact details and meet Israel-specific rules; Political Ads Library applies.¹ Authenticity covers misleading synthetic/manipulated media (global policy).⁶ Election information integrity/authenticity: Global policy states that Civic Integrity covers misleading participation information, voter suppression/intimidation and reach-restricting escalation labels; Authenticity covers inauthentic accounts / behavior and misleading synthetic/manipulated/out-of-context media. No Israel-specific 2026 deployment publicly documented. ² Israel-specific preparedness: No reviewed source documents 2026 Israel risk assessment, cross-functional election structure, X prompts, Grok official-source referral, or election reporting/research arrangements.	Election-specific operational preparedness: X rates each national election's risk (high/medium/low) to allocate resources, supported by a cross-functional election team. In 2026, it mapped 12+ risks with an electoral authority, prioritizing voting-period cases. ³ Authoritative election information: X has used “Election Day prompts”, redirected Grok election queries to official sources after inaccurate answers (2024), and added homepage and search prompts to electoral-authority information (2026).⁴ Election-authority cooperation/reporting: X and the electoral authorities have run expedited referrals and a dedicated alert channel since 2024; a 2026 agreement added a named authority contact, training and rapid-response mechanisms, with separate tracks for judicial orders, authority alerts and user reports. ⁵ Synthetic content & AI: X signed the voluntary 2024 AI Elections Accord (model risk, detection, provenance, transparency), but its commitments ran only through 2024. Enforcement & Community Notes: Community Notes add context but do not trigger enforcement; serious Civic Integrity cases may separately get reach-restricting labels. The Notes algorithm and data are public. ⁷ Research & transparency: Under the EU Digital Services Act, vetted researchers can request X data on content, Notes, ads and moderation; X also publishes some recommendation code.⁸ Grok /X 2026 election plan, covers Grok, but its Grok safeguards are limited to general audiovisual generation and are not election-specific.⁹	Local preparedness: Disclose Israel's election risk rating and the cross-functional team assigned to it; map Israel-specific risks with the Central Elections Committee, prioritizing the voting period. Authority cooperation: Set up a dedicated Central Elections Committee contact, rapid-alert channel and expedited referrals; publish response times. Authoritative information: Deploy X prompts and Grok redirects to official Central Elections Committee information on voting, candidate lists and results, tested in Hebrew, Arabic, Russian and Amharic. Community Notes/enforcement: Report Notes coverage and speed in Hebrew and Arabic, and Israel-specific Civic Integrity and Authenticity enforcement, including reach-restricting labels. Research/transparency: Grant vetted Israeli researchers access to election data; publish a post-election report on enforcement and moderation during Israel's 2026 general elections. Adopt election-specific X\Grok safeguards against misinformation, impersonation and vote recommendations; promptly correct erroneous election answers.

¹ X, “[Political Content](#)” (current policy; Israel-specific rules and Political Ads Library).

² X, “[Civic Integrity](#)” (Nov. 2025); X, “[Authenticity](#)” (Apr. 2025).

³ X, [Government Affairs Team, UK Parliament written evidence](#) (22 Apr. 2024); [European Commission, German DSA election stress test](#) (31 Jan. 2025); TSE, [X 2026 election-compliance summary](#) (10 Sep. 2026).

⁴ X, [Government Affairs Team, UK Parliament written evidence](#) (22 Apr. 2024). [Minnesota Secretary of State, Grok election-query changes](#) (26 Aug. 2024); TSE, [X election-information cooperation agreement](#) (28 Jul. 2026).

⁵ TSE, [X 2024 Memorandum of Understanding](#); TSE, [X election cooperation agreement](#) (28 Jul. 2026); TSE, [X 2026 election-compliance summary](#) (10 Sep. 2026).

⁶ X, “[Political Content](#)”; AI Elections Accord, “[The Commitments](#)” (voluntary commitments through 2024; X signatory); X, “[Authenticity](#)” (Apr. 2025).

⁷ X, “[Civic Integrity](#)” (Nov. 2025); X, “[About Community Notes on X](#)”.

⁸ X, “[DSA Data Access for Vetted Researchers](#)”; X, “[About Community Notes on X](#)”; TSE, [X 2026 election-compliance summary](#) (10 Sep. 2026).

⁹ TSE, [X 2026 election-compliance summary](#) (10 Sep. 2026) the plan covers X and Grok and separately describes existing Grok audiovisual-generation safeguards.