

OpenAI / ChatGPT

Documented measures specific or directly relevant to Israel	Election policies and mechanisms documented globally or outside Israel	Information and additional measures requested for Israel
Dedicated election readiness: No public documentation of an Israel-specific 2026 election program was identified in the sources reviewed. OpenAI's 2026 framework documents US/Brazil measures and names Intelligence and Investigations, Safety, Security and Integrity teams for election abuse.¹ Israel-relevant threat enforcement: In 2024 OpenAI disrupted “Zero Zeno”: an Israel-origin operation generating English/Hebrew and India-election content. OpenAI reported disrupting some India-election activity less than 24 hours after it began.⁴ Advertising: OpenAI lists Israel for self-service Ads Manager access where the advertising and billing legal entity is based in Israel; this does not establish user-side ad delivery. Its policy prohibits political ads and excludes political-content conversations from ad placement.^{6, 7}	Election readiness and localized measures: OpenAI's 2024 election work combined safety, threat intelligence, legal, engineering and policy. In the US, ChatGPT routed voting queries to CanIVote.org and results to AP/Reuters/election authorities; for the EU Parliament, voting questions went to the official site.² In May 2024 OpenAI reported engagement with officials in Europe, India, South Korea and Mexico, plus civil society/academic roundtables.³ In 2026 OpenAI announced AP live vote counts for United States and Brazil. In the US, it announced a Democracy Works partnership for voting logistics, offered election-infrastructure cybersecurity support, and reported engagement with NASS/NASED. In Brazil, its TSE plan provides Kodex for authorities and a general reporting form.^{1, 9} Political campaigning and election misuse: OpenAI prohibits scaled campaign advocacy, lobbying, election interference and demobilization, including automated outreach and individualized message targeting; specified human-directed internal campaign uses remain permitted.⁵ Synthetic-content provenance: Supported OpenAI images use C2PA and SynthID; supported OpenAI audio uses SynthID. Its verifier detects signals that do not establish accuracy or context.⁸ Evaluation, research and transparency: OpenAI publishes political-bias evaluations, offers eligible researchers subsidized API access, and reports election-related abuse. These support transparency/research, not an election-specific researcher-data interface.^{1, 10, 11}	Local election readiness: Disclose Israel election-monitoring functions, timing, resources, Hebrew/Arabic expertise, escalation and Central Elections Committee coordination. Clarify whether US-style election cybersecurity support can be adapted for Israel. Authoritative election information: Implement an Israel-specific mechanism for voting procedures, eligibility, polling, candidate/list information and official results. Explain official-source/web-search use and correction of stale or fabricated answers; test in Hebrew/Arabic and, where practicable, Russian/Amharic. Political misuse: Explain enforcement of election-interference, demobilization, scaled messaging, automated outreach and targeting rules across ChatGPT, API and agents. Clarify Israeli ad delivery and political-ad-ban enforcement; specify provenance/verification coverage and limitations for political and synthetic content. Reporting and escalation: Provide a priority reporting route for the Central Elections Committee and qualified civil society organizations, with defined handling and urgent-response times. Research and transparency: Publish localized evaluation methods/results, enable independent testing of authoritative-source behavior, political objectivity, misuse safeguards and provenance, and publish feasible aggregate Israeli abuse/enforcement data.

Sources

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